By René Geiser.
China’s nuclear expansion and global nuclear order
The expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal has increased significantly in recent years. Forecasts by the US Department of Defence assume that China could have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030. This represents a significant expansion compared to the ‘minimum nuclear deterrent’ that China has traditionally pursued.

While China used to strive for a small but survivable nuclear arsenal, the current modernization signals a possible shift in the balance of power. Through the introduction of new delivery systems, more mobile launchers and the construction of intercontinental silos, China is strengthening its nuclear presence in a way that challenges US nuclear dominance in particular.

The global nuclear order after the Cold War was largely based on a bipolar balance between the US and Russia. Countries such as China played a subordinate role despite their nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear expansion calls this balance into question. With an increase in its arsenal, China could become the third major nuclear power and change the existing strategic stability.

These developments clearly indicate that future nuclear disarmament negotiations, insofar as they are resumed given the current diplomatic ice age between the US and Russia, must also include China. The implications of the changed constellation of nuclear players became clear back in 2019 when the INF Treaty was cancelled. One of the reasons for the cancellation of the bilateral treaty between the USA and Russia, which provided for the destruction of all nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5000 km, was the non-inclusion of China and India.

If China continues to be excluded from these talks, this could undermine existing arms control agreements. A new nuclear arms race could also emerge in Asia, particularly between China, India and the USA. Countries such as Japan and South Korea could also adjust their security strategies, which would further exacerbate geopolitical tensions.

Strategic culture and strategic ambiguity
Historically, China’s nuclear policy has been based on two principles: the ‘no first use’ (NFU) strategy and minimum deterrence. The NFU stated that China would not use nuclear weapons first, but only in retaliation. To this end, most nuclear warheads are stored separately from their delivery systems in peacetime. However, the current modernization raises the question of whether China continues to adhere to these principles. Moreover, it is never specified how many nuclear weapons are needed for minimum deterrence.

There is also the possibility that China will develop a more flexible doctrine in the future, such as ‘launch on warning’. This would mean that nuclear weapons would be used immediately in the event of a suspected attack. Such a change would fundamentally alter China’s nuclear strategy.

In addition, China’s nuclear policy remains difficult to assess due to a lack of transparency. This lack of transparency increases the risk of misunderstandings and miscalculations, especially when dealing with other nuclear states such as the USA and its Asian partners such as South Korea or Japan. For China, this so-called strategic ambiguity is a trade-off for the large numerical asymmetry between the nuclear arsenals. The two nuclear principles are therefore only effective if deployment and numbers remain secret as far as possible.

A state’s strategic thinking is anchored in its national strategic culture, which encompasses norms, ideas and behaviors that shape its security policy actions. In China, cultural factors such as Mao Zedong’s views on nuclear weapons, Confucian conflict aversion and the teachings of Sun Tzu play a central role. Strategic culture influences how military force is used and is often slow to change.

China’s historical experiences, such as the ‘Century of Humiliation’ and the pursuit of the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’, form the framework for the foreign policy goals of the People’s Republic. Xi Jinping uses these concepts to strengthen national identity and legitimize strategic goals. While China interprets its military actions as defensive, official documents such as the 2019 Defence White Paper emphasize the principles of self-defense, although Xi’s rhetoric tends to be perceived as expansionist in the West. This is also due to China’s more aggressive behavior towards neighboring states in the South China Sea.

From the Chinese perspective, the modernization of the nuclear arsenal does not represent a departure from the principles of NFU and minimum deterrence, even though the need for such a departure is often debated between nuclear scientists and military officials. Instead, the expansion is considered necessary, given the nuclear and conventional superiority of the USA, in order to secure a viable arsenal. However, this lack of transparency leads to a security dilemma, as the USA and other states perceive the Chinese nuclear strategy as a threat.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, a detailed analysis of strategic culture is crucial. A better understanding of cultural differences can help to promote co-operative mechanisms and reduce mutual mistrust. Ultimately, China’s strategic culture has a significant influence on its current nuclear policy and thus largely on future nuclear arms control cooperation.

Conclusion
China’s nuclear modernization poses a challenge to the existing global nuclear order. With a growing arsenal, the previous numerical balance between the US and Russia is shifting further, triggering both regional and global uncertainty about a possible Cold War-like nuclear arms race.

Although China is officially sticking to its defensive nuclear strategy, the increasing lack of transparency raises questions about its long-term goals. An escalation of geopolitical tensions could be fueled by misunderstandings and a lack of communication. To prevent this, greater transparency and open dialogue about China’s nuclear intentions is necessary to preserve the stability of the global security order.