Irreversibility and Compliance in Regional Nuclear Disarmament:
Lessons from the VeSPoTec Tabletop Exercise II
By Neslihan Yanikömer. In an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, achieving nuclear disarmament requires more than political will—it demands a robust, realistic framework for implementation and compliance. To explore what such a framework might entail, the VeSPoTec research consortium conducted a 1.5-day tabletop exercise on April 10–11, 2025, focused on irreversibility and compliance within a regional disarmament scenario.
The exercise brought together experts from international organizations, think tanks, and research institutions to simulate the disarmament of three fictional nuclear-armed states under a hypothetical regional treaty. Central to the scenario was the creation of a Regional Verification Organization (RVO) responsible for overseeing and verifying state-specific disarmament commitments. The process offered a unique opportunity to stress-test how such agreements might function under real-world conditions.

A Structured Approach to a Complex Problem
The exercise was structured around three core components:
- Defining the RVO Mandate: Participants collaborated to define the institutional, technical, and legal responsibilities of the regional verification body.
- Negotiating Tailored Verification Measures: Each fictional state presented distinct disarmament profiles and fissile material inventories. Participants crafted state-specific verification strategies that balanced national conditions with mutual confidence.
- Testing Compliance Under Pressure: The final phase introduced scenarios simulating political tension, low trust, and technical uncertainty, challenging participants to evaluate the resilience of the proposed framework.
Key Insights and Emerging Themes
A major takeaway was the challenge of reconciling divergent technical and political perspectives. Disagreements surfaced, particularly regarding how to ensure irreversibility, especially in sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle.
A consistent theme was the tension between transparency and confidentiality. Since all participants represented nuclear-armed states, verification proposals leaned toward limited oversight—underscoring how stakeholder identity influences disarmament design. The absence of non-nuclear-armed perspectives, which might have advocated for more intrusive measures, revealed how verification frameworks can be shaped by political alignment and security concerns.
Nevertheless, the simulation encouraged innovative thinking. Participants explored early, low-interference measures to raise the cost of treaty reversal, reflecting the delicate balance between security interests and enforceable commitments.
The exercise also explored what constitutes sufficient confidence in a state’s compliance. Discussions addressed how to distinguish between legitimate deterrence and hedging behaviour suggestive of rearmament intent. Importantly, the disparity in nuclear capabilities and fissile material stocks among the fictional states demonstrated that standardized verification measures may not be viable. Instead, tailored approaches, grounded in mutual understanding and supported by institutions like the RVO, were seen as more effective.
Building Toward Future Disarmament

Participants’ diverse regional backgrounds—from the Middle East, South and East Asia, the United States, and Europe—enriched the dialogue. Their combined technical and political insights contributed to a nuanced view of the requirements for successful disarmament in varied contexts.
Beyond technical solutions, the simulation highlighted the broader foundations of treaty success: capacity building, technological cooperation, and selective transparency. These elements were identified as essential for fostering trust and aligning national interests with collective disarmament goals.