A major takeaway was the challenge of reconciling divergent technical and political perspectives. Disagreements surfaced, particularly regarding how to ensure irreversibility, especially in sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle.

A consistent theme was the tension between transparency and confidentiality. Since all participants represented nuclear-armed states, verification proposals leaned toward limited oversight—underscoring how stakeholder identity influences disarmament design. The absence of non-nuclear-armed perspectives, which might have advocated for more intrusive measures, revealed how verification frameworks can be shaped by political alignment and security concerns.

Nevertheless, the simulation encouraged innovative thinking. Participants explored early, low-interference measures to raise the cost of treaty reversal, reflecting the delicate balance between security interests and enforceable commitments.

The exercise also explored what constitutes sufficient confidence in a state’s compliance. Discussions addressed how to distinguish between legitimate deterrence and hedging behaviour suggestive of rearmament intent. Importantly, the disparity in nuclear capabilities and fissile material stocks among the fictional states demonstrated that standardized verification measures may not be viable. Instead, tailored approaches, grounded in mutual understanding and supported by institutions like the RVO, were seen as more effective.