New Perspectives on Nuclear Verification

by Philipp Fischer (University of Hamburg)

Nuclear verification is a critical component of global security, ensuring compliance with international treaties and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, verification efforts are facing growing challenges due to technological advances and geopolitical tensions. At the same time, more countries are developing nuclear energy programmes, leading to an increase in nuclear-related infrastructure and data. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that the world’s nuclear power capacity will increase by a factor of 2.5 compared to current levels. While the IAEA is central to global verification and non-proliferation efforts, it cannot monitor everything. Open-source intelligence (OSINT), based on publicly available data, offers a powerful complement to traditional verification methods by increasing transparency and improving detection capabilities. This type of “societal verification” can involve actors beyond governments and international institutions by making use of digital technologies and publicly available information.

One of the greatest challenges of nuclear verification is the monitoring of facilities and activities, especially in remote or restricted areas. For example, OSINT uses high-resolution satellite imagery from commercial providers such as Planet Labs and Maxar, enabling analysts to track infrastructure developments, detect changes to existing facilities and the surrounding environment, and identify suspicious activity. Social media, local news and geotagged imagery can also provide early warning of the movement of nuclear materials or personnel, including nuclear test sites and potential preparations for renewed testing. As the number of nuclear facilities and the volume of relevant data grows, OSINT also helps fill gaps in institutional verification. NGO and independent analysts can contribute to monitoring efforts, thereby assisting the efforts of the IAEA.

Despite its advantages, OSINT has its limitations. The sheer volume of data requires advanced analytical tools and expertise to separate useful information from noise, especially concerning data from social media and misleading statements from governments. Misinformation and disinformation can further distort findings and make independent verification difficult. Some governments may also restrict access to critical information, limiting the effectiveness of OSINT. In addition, public OSINT disclosures can raise ethical concerns regarding what information should be published and when. The desire to be both accurate and fast can sometimes present a dilemma.

Conclusion

OSINT is an increasingly valuable tool in nuclear verification, providing independent insights that complement institutional efforts. By enhancing monitoring, improving detection capabilities and engaging civil society, OSINT contributes to a more transparent and robust verification system. Enhancing its effectiveness can be achieved by supporting it with diplomatic and legal frameworks while integrating it with traditional verification mechanisms.

Beyond its technical contributions, OSINT is also reshaping who can participate in nuclear verification. Unlike traditional verification roles, which often require specialised training and institutional support, OSINT enables a wider range of actors to contribute through digital investigations. Open access tools are lowering the barriers to entry and attracting new generations of analysts with skills in satellite imagery and geolocation. However, OSINT is most effective when integrated with traditional verification mechanisms such as on-site inspections by the IAEA and supported by diplomatic and legal frameworks.

Philipp Fischer is a master’s student of Peace and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg.  He was previously an intern at the Open Nuclear Network in Vienna, where he worked with OSINT techniques to assess nuclear risks.