Read more about the article VeSPoTec at the AMC Annual Conference 2024
Members of VeSPoTec and NVD at the AMC Annual Conference 2024.

VeSPoTec at the AMC Annual Conference 2024

By Julian Schäfer. Dr. Sophie Kretzschmar, Dr. Leonardo Bandarra, Lukas Rademacher and Julian Schäfer from VeSPoTec participated in the AMC Annual Conference Reinvigorating Nuclear Disarmament in Uppsala, Sweden from the 18-19 June 2024. Organized by the Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament, the event aimed to foster collaboration and innovative solutions to advance nuclear disarmament. Thus, the conference gathered experts from various disciplines to discuss the urgent need for renewed efforts in arms control and non-proliferation amidst a challenging global landscape. During the Conference, the VeSPoTec delegation presented five projects that are currently being worked on within the VeSPoTec consortium.

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Read more about the article Game Theory and Verification

Game Theory and Verification

By Andreas Dürholt. Game Theory is a mathematical discipline to analyze strategic interaction between two or more players. In general, strategic considerations exists for thousands of years (see for instance, Sun Tzu). But Game Theory as a discipline was officially developed by John von Neumann und Oscar Morgenstern in the 1940s’, although its economic predecessors go back to previous centuries. However, Game Theory has developed from classical Game Theory to many different intertwining sub-disciplines (e.g., Evolutionary Game Theory, Algorithmic Game Theory, Behavioral Game Theory, Mechanism Design, etc.) In a game the players (which can be states, individuals, organizations, etc.) can choose between various decisions. In game theory the best decision in dependence on the opponent’s decision should be selected. These strategic considerations have been applied to international relations, especially regarding arms races, nuclear proliferation, deterrence and nuclear verification. In the context of nuclear verification, states can either cooperate or defect. Normally, countries want to check and observe the opponent’s behavior, but there are sometimes exceptions when states want to create ‘strategic uncertainty’. Accordingly, they do not always act in accordance with contracts, they could also cheat on them. However, game-theoretic models could be used to organize IAEO-inspections more thorough, and they are necessary to check whether a state is following a treaty. Consequently, by using these mathematical models, strategic loopholes can be uncovered, treaties can be designed more robust, and inspections can be arranged more efficiently.

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Read more about the article NEW PUBLICATION: “We’re Taking Back the Narrative”. An Interview with Benetick Kabua Maddison, of the Marshallese Educational Initiative

NEW PUBLICATION: “We’re Taking Back the Narrative”. An Interview with Benetick Kabua Maddison, of the Marshallese Educational Initiative

By Julian Schäfer. Since the film ‘Oppenheimer’ at the latest, nuclear weapons and their eminent dangers have once again become the focus of public attention. The film impressively demonstrates the almost unimaginably destructive effects of even a comparatively small nuclear weapon such as ‘the Gadget’. However, the film barely touches on the devastating long-term effects that weapons of this kind have on the people and environment affected. After the Second World War, the United States of America carried out 67 nuclear tests in the Republic of the Marshall Islands over a period of 12 years and thus created a lasting nuclear largely. These included "Castle Bravo", the most powerful test of a thermonuclear device by the US, with an explosion equivalent to 1,000 of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima. To this day, these tests have had a lasting impact on the Marshallese environment and people, causing environmental degradation and intergenerational health problems for the local population. In a new publication, Linda Ostermann and Julian Schäfer conducted an interview with Benetick Kabua Maddison, Executive Director of the Marshallese Educational Initiative. The NGO aims to raise awareness of the effects of nuclear testing and climate change in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). In the interview, Maddison discusses the Compact of Free Association (COFA) between the RMI and the US, which governs their political and economic relationship and advocates for a new COFA based on trust, accountability, and transparency that addresses the nuclear legacy. Furthermore, Maddison criticizes the portrayal of nuclear testing as a contribution to security, highlights the humanitarian and environmental neglect, and stresses the importance of education and global solidarity to achieve nuclear justice and address the cultural consequences of nuclear testing. The interview was published in “Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice” under the guest editorship Leonardo Bandarra and Patrícia Nabuco Martuscelli.

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Read more about the article Nuclear Safeguards and Irreversibility in the Reduction and Elimination of Military Nuclear Stockpiles: Three Key Questions

Nuclear Safeguards and Irreversibility in the Reduction and Elimination of Military Nuclear Stockpiles: Three Key Questions

By Leonardo Bandarra and Noah Mayhew. On 8 April 2024, the research consortium VeSPoTec (Verification in a Complex and Unpredictable World: Social, Political and Technical Processes) and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) held a workshop focused on the potential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the irreversible reduction and elimination of military nuclear stockpiles. Participants included senior former and current practitioners from the field of nuclear verification and international safeguards. In addition to guided discussions, invited experts participated in a simulated negotiation in which a fictitious, formerly armed State was accused of reconstituting its nuclear weapons programme. Some of the main takeaways from the workshop are listed below. Which body should verify nuclear disarmament? During discussions, many participants cited the IAEA as a logical choice to be involved in disarmament verification, particularly in the verification of nuclear material from nuclear weapons programmes without classified characteristics, or the dismantlement or monitoring of relevant nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Others highlighted that adding new activities to the IAEA could generate challenges, including exacerbating the IAEA’s existing resource constraints. Participants also cited the potential for internal cultural tensions within the IAEA: would there be “regular inspectors” for non-nuclear-weapon States and a separate cadre of inspectors for formerly nuclear-armed States? Most participants agreed that the way in which a nuclear-armed State disarms will affect how verification is conducted. South Africa was referenced as a case in which the IAEA verified the absence of a nuclear weapons programme only after disarmament had occurred unilaterally. Others suggested the need for a new institutional framework—either a new organisation or a multilateral framework—to assist and oversee disarmament. How would disarmament verification be resourced? Participants agreed that, regardless of which body verifies disarmament, an increase in the resources currently allocated for nuclear verification will be required. Should verification be conducted by the IAEA, the Agency would require a significant budget increase. It could be in the form of a regular budget increase, an extrabudgetary fund created for nuclear disarmament verification (like the Nuclear Security Fund), or an agreement that specifies the IAEA as the verification body to which parties would contribute (like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). It could also be a different model altogether. Even if the IAEA were not to play an active role in verifying nuclear disarmament, in a disarming world it would still need to significantly increase the staff of the inspectorate to account for the large increase in nuclear material that would become subject to safeguards in formerly nuclear-armed States. The view was also expressed that if there were to be a safeguards budget separate from a disarmament budget in the IAEA, great care would have to be taken so that they did not become entangled. How much could be verified, and what is sufficient for former nuclear-armed states? Participants agreed that “100 percent verification” is impossible, even in the best of verification circumstances, but particularly in verifying the disarmed status of a State, owing to the need for efficiencies in verification and the large scale of current nuclear-weapon States’ nuclear programmes. For these reasons, it would be unlikely that the IAEA would be able to draw conclusions for disarmed States about the completeness of declarations in the near and medium terms. The IAEA would also likely continue to be constrained from directly accessing any material with classified characteristics, though several participants noted the Trilateral Initiative as an example of the IAEA working collaboratively with States to provide “sufficient confidence” that nuclear material with classified characteristics met certain thresholds in isotopic composition and mass and was then placed under safeguards. Several participants noted that the universalisation of additional protocols to safeguards agreements would be a stabilising factor in a world where most or all States have disarmed. There was some discussion as to whether an additional legal instrument with tailored provisions for non-compliance would need to be concluded by formerly nuclear-armed States. Some participants noted that such an instrument would be highly dependent on the context in which States disarm and the technology available.

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Read more about the article VeSPoTec at the 55th “AFK-Kolloquium” of the German Association of Peace and Conflict Studies

VeSPoTec at the 55th “AFK-Kolloquium” of the German Association of Peace and Conflict Studies

By Linda Ostermann. VeSPoTec could not miss this year’s “AFK-Kolloquium” – a scientific conference – of the German Association of Peace and Conflict Studies: under the theme of “Disci-plines of peace and conflict research in dialog: Synergies, similarities and differ-ences with scientific-technical peace research”, five members of the VeSPoTec consortium gave input on our daily lived interdisciplinary experiences and chal-lenges, and presented on their current research interests and results.

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Read more about the article Digging in the past to pave the way for the future: nuclear archaeology and irreversible nuclear disarmament.
Drawing of a nuclear archaeologist. Generated with: Craiyon.

Digging in the past to pave the way for the future: nuclear archaeology and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

By Sophie Kretzschmar. There is a strange concurrence of fundamentally different developments in the world today regarding nuclear disarmament: On the one hand, nuclear disarmament seems to have taken several steps backwards – nuclear weapon states are increasing and modernizing their nuclear arsenals, and debates about new nuclear arrangements, however unreasonable these discussions are, have entered the discourse. On the other hand, nuclear disarmament seems to have taken a step forward – a treaty banning nuclear weapons, supported by 139 of the world’s 197 states, is in force since 2021, and active work is on the way to implement the treaty. Across these divides, Germany’s stated goal is to build bridges: Nuclear disarmament is postponed, “taking into account the current security environment”, but the “commitment to strive towards a safe world free of nuclear weapons” remains. For the disarmament research community, this confirms the mission: to use this time to develop and prepare tools to support nuclear disarmament.

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Read more about the article Nuclear Safeguards under Crisis Conditions: The VeSPoTec Table Top Exercise I
The Participants of the first VeSPoTec Table Top Exercise

Nuclear Safeguards under Crisis Conditions: The VeSPoTec Table Top Exercise I

By Andreas Dürholt and Lukas Rademacher. On December 13 and 14, the VeSPoTec-Team welcomed nine technical experts from six different countries for a tabletop exercise on nuclear safeguards in Aachen. The exercise focused on the role that different types of safeguards-relevant information play for evaluating a State in the context of their safeguards obligations through a series of role-played discussions. 

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